INTRODUCTION
Unlike Athena who sprung fully formed from Zeus's head, federal laws are generated over time by historical and political pressures. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA 74) 1 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 2 were products of the byzantine Watergate scandal.
3
These federal statutes grew out of a dark chapter in American history when the Nixon Administration peddled policy outcomes to rich individuals and corporations willing to spend staggering sums. FECA 74 attempted to
House tape recorders were humming along at all hours of the day. 15 Like the Blagojevich tapes, the Nixon tapes reveal quid pro quo corruption. Without the Watergate investigation, the public may have never known about these tapes.
The word "Watergate" itself is an instant Rorschach test. For some, "Watergate" is one of DC's most recognizable edifices. 16 For others, "Watergate" is a synonym for the Nixon Plumbers' DNC burglaries, 17 the White House cover-up, 18 the Senate hearings, 19 or the first presidential resignation in U.S. history. 20 When I use the word "Watergate," as a campaign finance lawyer, I mean the stunning examples of quid pro quo corruption in the Nixon White House. Lastly, when I state my fear that we are poised for a second Watergate, I mean an epic money-in-politics scandal. 21 Forty years after Watergate, the money-in-politics problem may be even worse than in Nixon's day. Corporations could not spend money in favor of Nixon (directly or indirectly) without breaking federal law. After Citizens United v. FEC, 22 publicly traded companies can legally purchase an unlimited supply of political ads and they can dump millions of dollars at a time into Super PACs to support (or oppose) federal candidates, including a sitting President. Part I of this essay will focus first on: (A) the pay-to-play culture in the Nixon White House, (B) the selling of Nixon's ambassadorships to large campaign contributors, (C) the illegal corporate campaign contributions to the Committee for the Reelection of the President (CREEP), as well as (D) international corporate political expenditures. Next, Part II of this essay will discuss two of the post-Watergate reforms that responded to these problems: Congress's expansive Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 24 and the very ambitious Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (also known as FECA 74). 25 This piece will argue that the scale of these post-Watergate reforms was justified by the magnitude of the quid pro quo corruption in the Nixon White House. 26 This essay will close in Part III by making the case that in 2012, in this post-Citizens United environment, Congress should take a similar approach and embrace both (A) securities law reforms, as well as (B) campaign finance reforms, to ensure the integrity of our democratic processes. 27 I. DIRTY MONEY FOR DIRTY TRICKS Deep Throat, who we now know was the FBI's Mark Felt, 28 told Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, who were digging into the connection between the White House and the Watergate burglary, to follow the money trail. 29 The money that had paid for the (1976) ). 26 See SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at XXIII ("[This report] is also an appraisal of the events that led to the burglary and its sordid aftermath, an aftermath characterized by corruption, fraud, and abuse of official power."). 
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How Much is an Ambassadorship? 67 DNC burglary came from CREEP. 30 The CREEP bank accounts were flush with funds from large donors. 31 As it turns out, the money in CREEP came from legitimate campaign contributions, illegitimate money from rich individuals seeking federal appointments, and cash from illegal and laundered corporate sources.
32
When prosecutors asked about the source of the million dollars from the "cancer on the presidency" discussion with John Dean, ex-President Nixon testified before a grand jury in 1975, "I was referring to funds we could get . . . . And what I meant . . . is I had a number of friends who are very wealthy, who if they believed it was a right kind of a cause would have contributed a million dollars, and I think I could have gotten it within a matter of a week." 33 Some of those wealthy friends had donated extraordinarily large sums to the 1972 reelection campaign. 34 Enabling the particularly large contributions was a gap in the federal disclosure laws from February to April 1972. 35 This money was used for all sorts of dirty tricks, ranging from the sophomoric to the criminal, including the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins. 36 Furthermore, Nixon had taken great pains to set up the Committee for the Reelection of the President (CREEP), as a committee separate from the Republican National Committee (RNC). This gave him greater control over the campaign funds, without the normal party discipline. 37 35 REEVES, supra note 31, at 462 ("But there was no law. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1972, a compromise bill that passed both houses of Congress by huge margins and was signed into law by the President on February 7 . . . . The new law would not take effect until April 7-sixty days after the President signed it . . . . In those sixty days, the President and his committee collected more than $20 million-almost $2 million of it in cash-with no requirement or intention to name names and amounts."). Thus, all that he admitted was that contributors got more access to the White House.
Despite Nixon's sanitized memory of the day-to-day workings of his administration, evidence strongly suggests that a pay-to-play culture had taken hold in his White House. 42 The Administration could leverage its power as the law enforcement branch to extract large campaign contributions from people and companies facing federal liabilities. Instances of pay to play included dropping federal investigations and antitrust cases. As Richard Reeves noted, "The contributors [to CREEP] . . . included several executives and companies in trouble with the Justice process that led to Watergate emasculated important party functions. It began with the decision to take the party's leader, and his reelection out of the Republican Party and into an independent entity, unresponsive to the checks and balances of party politics . . . [CREEP] was a political disaster.")). 38 In a February 25, 1974, news conference, President Nixon denied that his administration was involved in the practice of brokering ambassadorships. He declared, "Ambassadorships have not been for sale and I would not approve an ambassadorship unless the man or woman was qualified clearly apart from his contribution." That very day, his personal attorney and one of his principal fundraisers, Herbert Kalmbach, became the first person in recent times to be convicted for "selling an ambassadorship," in violation of title 18, United States Code, section 600.
66
Mr. Kalmbach was convicted of promising the U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad, J. Fife Symington, a more prestigious European ambassadorship in exchange for $100,000 in campaign donations. 67 Mr. Kalmbach served six months in jail for this behavior. 68 Apparently, Mr. Symington was not alone in giving large campaign donations with the expectation that an ambassadorial appointment would be the reward. 69 The Ambassador to France, Arthur Watson, gave $300,000 to CREEP, and the Ambassador to Britain, Walter Annenberg, gave $250,000, before their respective appointments.
70
The Luxembourg ambassadorship was purchased by Dr. Ruth B. Farkas. 71 Originally, she considered being the Ambassador of Costa Rica in 1971. 72 The price for the post Mr. Kalmbach suggested was $250,000.
73
Dr. Farkas's response to this price was, "Well, you know, I am interested in Europe, I think, and isn't two hundred and fifty thousand dollars an awful Farrell, supra note 10 (noting that President Nixon followed the "traditional American practice" of naming rich donors to luxury ambassadorships such as Luxembourg and El Salvador 78 Id.; see also SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 494 (quoting Senator Pell, "Benelux seems to be the most expensive place on which to be appointed because Mrs. Farkas, who is ambassador to Luxembourg, and she wasn't appointed until her contribution had been put to the barrelhead even though an agreement had been received 6 or 8 months earlier, contributed $300,000 . . . ."). 79 80 Id. at 27 ("I can't believe that I would have ever have made any commitment to him or anyone else to be an ambassador for a financial contribution.").
81 Id. at 25 ("As far as career ambassadors, most of them are a bunch of eunuchs, and I don't mean that in a physical sense, but I meant it in an emotional sense, in a mental sense."). 82 Id. at 35. 83 Five here refers to the following five individuals Ruth Farkas, J. Fife Symington, Jr., Vincent deRoulet, Cornelius V. Whitney and Kingdon Gould, Jr. Id. at 6. 84 Id. at 53.
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The closest Nixon comes to admitting any impropriety in his grand jury testimony was the following statement in which he explained why certain large contributions were returned to contributors when an ambassadorship was not granted: [If] The huge campaign contributions. The gifts from people who wanted to be ambassadors. The campaign specific large contributions [done] with anticipation of government actions, such as the milk producers. The large number of corporate officials who were convicted and many of whom pleaded guilty to illegal campaign contributions. 88 Even though Mr. Friedman spoke to the Supreme Court Justices as if all of them in the room were painfully aware of the corruption of the Nixon White House, by the time that the actual Buckley Supreme Court opinion was written, the selling of ambassadorships and the illegal corporate campaign contributions were nowhere to be found in the text of the 85 Id. at 46. 86 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 494. 87 WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 78 ("Although contributors of large campaign sums obviously received Administration responses to their desires to serve as ambassadors, a crime is not proved unless the prosecution can show a prior quid pro quo arrangement, i.e., a prior commitment of support for the position in exchange for a forthcoming contribution. Such proof is available only if one of the participants in such a conversation admits the express commitment. However, each official and fundraiser involved denied having made promises of appointments and WSPF was unable to prove the contrary."). To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. (1976) . 90 Id. at 26-27. 91 Id. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.").
92 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1970) ("Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, work, compensation, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress, to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in any election, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.").
93 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) ("It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office . . . ."). are not citizens of the United States, and so far as the franchise is concerned, must at all times be held subservient and subordinate to the government and the citizenship of which it is composed"). 95 There is one lower court case post-Citizens United which held that the Tillman Act could not be used in that particular case. U.S. v. Danielczyk, 791 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding the federal Tillman Act's ban on corporate donations unconstitutional as applied to a specific corporation). The Danielczyk case is currently on appeal. 96 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (explaining "the [corporate contribution] ban has always done further duty in protecting 'the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.'") (internal citations omitted); id. at 163 ("The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . .").
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So then, as now, corporations were (and are) legally banned from giving corporate treasury funds to a federal candidate, including a sitting President seeking funds for his reelection. But this did not stop those in charge of CREEP from seeking illegal corporate contributions. The reason corporate officers gave corporate money to the President's reelection campaign was to "avoid possible retaliation by the Nixon administration." 97 According to some of the corporate executives who testified before the Senate Select Committee investigating Watergate, the fundraising by CREEP was the equivalent of a shake down by a mobster-pay up or else. 98 Since many of the companies in question had matters pending before federal regulators, they paid when asked. As George Spater 99 of American Airlines testified:
There were two aspects: would you get something if you gave it, or would you be prevented from getting something if you didn't give it? . . . Most contributions from the business community are not volunteered to seek a competitive advantage but are made in response to pressure, for fear of the competitive disadvantage that might result if they are not made . . . .
100
And so pay American Airlines did, first monetarily, 101 and then with a misdemeanor criminal conviction.
102
Gulf Oil's Vice President of Governmental Relations, Claude Wild, said he decided to arrange a $50,000 contribution from Gulf Oil's general treasury funds to CREEP so that his company would not be on a "blacklist" or at the "bottom of the totem pole" when it came time for someone in Washington to return his phone calls. 103 Another corporate executive, the Chairman of Ashland Oil Co., Orin Atkins, viewed the corporate contributions to CREEP as a necessary "calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view heard."
104
Whatever the reasons executives gave post hoc for the political contributions, the fact remained that it was illegal for corporations to contribute, thus giving to CREEP opened the payers and the payees to 97 Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2,500 limit per committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation . . . with Nixon fund raisers, to break down the $2 million into numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting requirements without disclosure.
111
The $2,500 contribution level was picked not only to avoid disclosure, but also to avoid triggering the IRS gift tax, which kicked in at $3,000 at the time.
112
The obfuscation nearly worked. As the Senate Select Committee's Report detailed, "the milk producers could report the contributions [to the 100 intermediate] . . . committees, without the ultimate beneficiary, the 105 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) . 106 See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 118 (2010) ("The hierarchical structure of corporations made it possible for a handful of decision makers to deploy those resources and combine them with the massive but underutilized capacities of their far-flung organizations. These were the preconditions for an organizational revolution that was to remake Washington in less than a decade-and, in the process, lay the critical groundwork for winner-take-all politics."). President's campaign, being disclosed. 113 And, moreover, the names of the committees were meant to be innocuous, such as the one ironically named, "Americans United for Honesty in Government."
114
The Agriculture Department was not prepared to accede to the dairy industry's request for increased federal price supports, but President Nixon reversed the Department's decision.
115 President Nixon's personal intervention in the milk price supports was explained by one court in the following manner:
On March 23, 1971, after a meeting with dairy organization representatives, President Nixon decided to overrule the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and to increase price supports. In . . . a meeting held by Herbert Kalmbach at the direction of John Ehrlichman, the dairymen were informed of the likelihood of an imminent increase and of the desire that they reaffirm their $2 million pledge.
116
Reporter Richard Reeves suggested that in the deal with the dairy industry, "Nixon got $2 million for charging American consumers $100 million." 117 Nixon's taping system picked up details of the dairy deal. John Ehrlichman, the President's Counsel, is heard to say on the tapes, "better go get ourselves a glass of milk. Drink it while it's still cheap."
118 Then, laughter is heard on the tape. 119 Nixon himself was informed of the deal by Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President. 120 The head of AMPI and one of its lobbyists eventually went to prison for this conduct. 121 The exchange of campaign money for milk price supports shows that contributions were given for specific governmental actions. One dairyman who participated in the deal described the reality of quid pro quo corruption from an insider's perspective:
If dairymen are to receive their fair share of the governmental financial pie that we all pay for, we must have friends in Government. I have become increasingly aware that the sincere and soft voice of the dairy farmer is no match for the jingle 113 SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 13, at 615. 114 Id. at 693. 115 Id. at 1209 (" [I] t is important to note that the legitimate functions of the Agriculture Department were circumvented and interfered with."). 116 As it turns out, money from the dairymen paid for part of the Ellsberg break-in. 123 The dirty money paid for dirty tricks.
The Watergate Special Prosecutor's office investigated President Nixon on ten separate matters, including the milk price supports. 124 Because Nixon was pardoned by President Ford, the American public never learned the full extent of his Administration's illegal activities. 132 As this list shows, they were not fly by night operations; rather, they were blue chip American companies breaking the law. Northrop faced additional liability because it was a government contractor at the time the corporation donated, which was barred under the Hatch Act.
133
Another aspect to consider is that this illegal corporate money was not given to CREEP by some rogue employee. The source was typically either from a corporation's in-house governmental relations shop, or in some cases, the head of the company. 134 Another jarring dimension of the corporate donations to CREEP is the dollar figures involved. According to the Senate Select Committee's final report, Goodyear gave $40,000, 137 Ashland Oil gave $100,000, 138 Gulf Oil gave $100,000, 139 Philips Petroleum gave $100,000, 140 and Northrop gave $150,000. 141 And recall, these figures are all in 1972 dollars. If this last figure is translated into 2012 dollars, $150,000 in 1972 would roughly equal $800,000 today. 142 Moreover, because the corporate campaign contributions were illegal, the companies paying them to CREEP often had to launder the money through a foreign subsidiary or a foreign bank in order to make the payment. 143 Payments were often made in cash and in person since neither side wanted the paper trail that accompanies a check. 144 These details came to light in Senate testimony by Claude Wild, Vice President of Government Affairs of Gulf Oil. 145 Mr. Wild gave a grand total of $100,000 146 and pleaded guilty of violating the federal election laws 147 for his donation of corporate funds to
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How Much is an Ambassadorship? 81 CREEP. 148 Later investigations revealed that the $100,000 was only the tip of the iceberg, and that $5.4 million returned to Gulf Oil from foreign countries in off-book transactions. 149 This money was used for political contributions, gifts, and related expenses. 150 However, Gulf Oil was not alone in laundering political donations.
151
American Airlines paid $100,000, which was drawn from a New York bank, routed through a Swiss account of a Lebanese agent, and then transferred back to a different New York bank. 152 Meanwhile, Braniff Airlines gave CREEP a $40,000 donation by billing a Panamanian company, owned by a Braniff manager, for "expenses and services," and forwarding cash from the transaction from Panama to Dallas, then on to an agent of CREEP. 153 The 3M Company misappropriated corporate funds for secret domestic political contributions. "The assets of the [3M] secret fund were generated through fictitious foreign insurance premiums . . . and through kickbacks by a foreign legal consultant."
154 Even on the so-called "smoking gun" tape, which proves that Nixon was part of the Watergate cover-up, White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman informed President Nixon of money for the DNC burglary being traced through a Mexican bank.
155
Given the sensitive nature of information regarding the illegal sources of campaign funds, the record of donors to CREEP was a closely held secret. Nixon was correct about one thing: the problem of money in politics was a bipartisan one, and corporate donors were playing both sides of the fence. As J. Anthony Lukas reports:
Several companies that made corporate contributions in 1972 have now conceded that their gifts came from large political "slush funds" which in some cases had been in existence for more than a decade. The largest discovered so far-$10.3 million-belonged to Gulf Oil, which acknowledged that it used the money for political contributions and "related activities" here and abroad between 1960 and 1974 . . . . [3M] conceded that between 1963 and 1972 it doled out at least $634,000 in 390 contributions to politicians of both parties. Northrop spent $476,000 since 1961, Phillips Petroleum spent some $585,000 in ten years, and Ashland Oil $801,165 in eight years-both excluding their 1972 contributions to Nixon. 
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Furthermore, the corporate political spending was not just bipartisan; it was also international. 164 In the aftermath of Watergate, federal investigations revealed that hundreds of American corporations had made questionable or illegal payments both domestically and to foreign governments-including campaign contributions. Stanley Sporkin, then Director of SEC Enforcement, was curious about how corporate payments from publicly traded corporations, revealed during the Watergate investigations, could make their way into a presidential campaign when such donations were patently illegal. 167 He remarked, "What sparked my interest was the fact that these were cash payments to the Committee to Reelect the President which came directly out of the corporate treasuries. And I knew that was illegal." 168 
Mr. Sporkin continued:
How does Gulf Oil record a transaction of a $50,000 cash payment? I wanted to know, what account did they charge? Do they have an account called "Bribery"? And so I decided to ask one of my investigators to go out and find out how they did it . . . . When we looked into these funds, we found out they were not only being used domestically in the United States for illegal campaign contributions, but we found that the same monies were being used to bribe officials overseas in connection with the companies' business. The press reports of American companies giving money to foreign officials had enormous impacts abroad. As Laura E. Longobardi reported:
164 ALEXANDER, supra note 97, at 20 (reporting on U.S. corporations' international political spending as revealed by the Watergate investigation and noting that "millions of [corporate] dollars [were] known to have been given to politicians in Italy, Korea and other countries"). 165 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 27, at 405. . 167 See FRONTLINE, supra note 145; SEC REPORT ON ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS, supra note 136, at 2 ("In 1973, as a result of the work of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, several corporations and executives officers were charged with using corporate funds for illegal domestic political contributions. The Commission recognized that these activities involved matters of possible significance to public investors, the nondisclosure of which might entail violations of the federal securities laws. . . . The Commission's inquiry into the circumstances surrounding alleged illegal political campaign contributions revealed that violations of the federal securities laws had indeed occurred."). The discovery of payments by Lockheed to the Prime Minister of Japan, for example, forced his resignation and chilled relations between the two countries.
Reports that Lockheed had paid Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands $1 million compelled him to relinquish his official functions. Finally, reputed payments by Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil, Gulf and other corporations to the Italian Government caused the Italian President to resign and strained United States relations with Italy, the surrounding Mediterranean area and the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.
170
In other words, President Nixon was not the only head of state to resign in the wake of Watergate. Rather, the impact was felt in capitols across the globe. The revelations of corporate political slush funds resulted in the SEC's requiring voluntary disclosure by public corporations of questionable foreign and domestic political payments. 171 One aspect of the questionable payments that most disturbed the SEC was the obfuscation involved. As the SEC reported to Congress in 1976: "The almost universal characteristic of the cases . . . has been the apparent frustration of our system of corporate accountability which . . . 172 The SEC explained to Congress the depth of the deception by publicly traded companies included "falsifications of corporate financial records, designed to disguise or conceal the source and application of corporate funds misused for illegal purposes, as well as the existence of secret 'slush funds' disbursed outside the normal financial accountability system."
173 Not surprisingly, central among the legislative fixes to this problem was a strict requirement to keep accurate books and records. 174 The scope of the questionable and illegal payments was quite vast, occurring not just among a few bad apples, but rather in hundreds of top American firms. 175 The Senate Report on this investigation noted: Or as the Department of Justice put it, post-Watergate investigations by the SEC revealed: "The abuses ran the gamut from bribery of high foreign officials to secure some type of favorable action by a foreign government to so-called facilitating payments that allegedly were made to ensure that government functionaries discharged certain ministerial or clerical duties." 177 The GAO reported that, in total, 450 companies admitted making $300 million in questionable or illegal payments. 178 These SEC investigations prompted the Congress to pass the FCPA. 179 The major purpose of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) was to prevent corporate bribery of foreign officials that came to light in post-Watergate investigations. 180 Thus, the FCPA is one of many reforms inspired by Watergate. 181 The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require registered issuers to keep detailed books, records, and accounts that accurately record corporate payments and transactions. 182 The FCPA also requires SEC registered issuers to institute and maintain an internal Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:1 accounting control system.
183
Thirdly, the FCPA prohibits domestic corporations, whether or not registered with the SEC, from bribing a foreign official, a foreign political party, party official, or candidate for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining business.
184
The FCPA applies to political contributions abroad if they are made with corrupt motives. 185 The SEC has brought a few cases under the statute for foreign political contributions. 186 In one case, Schering-Plough gave $76,000 to a charity headed by a Polish official that purchased health materials for Polish hospitals. 187 In another case, Titan paid $3.5 million to an agent in Benin who funneled the money to the election of Benin's incumbent president. 188 Congress also enacted the FCPA to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American capital markets. 189 In a speech supporting the passage of the FCPA, then-SEC Commissioner John R. Evans argued for the need for transparency and highlighted the risk posed to the soundness of the financial markets by these foreign bribes: "[These overseas payments] . . . raise questions regarding the quality and integrity of professional corporate managers and whether they are fulfilling their obligations to their boards of directors, shareholders, and the general public." 190 For decades the FCPA lay fallow-rarely enforced. 191 But the statute has enjoyed a post-9/11 renaissance. 192 Nearly thirty-five years later, the FCPA serves as a powerful anti-corruption tool outside of the United States. 193 The U.S. was the first country, via the FCPA, to criminalize the
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How Much is an Ambassadorship? 87 practice of bribing foreign officials, and was alone in doing so for two decades. 194 In 1997, the FCPA was expanded to cover extra-territorial jurisdiction over U.S. companies and U.S. nationals in non-U.S. companies. 195 At the same time, the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions was signed in 1997. 196 This convention has thirty-four signatories, including the U.S., and is meant to criminalize bribery among many of America's trading partners. 197 The FCPA is enforced jointly by the SEC and DOJ. 198 FCPA penalties have increased in severity over time, as the SEC and DOJ have sought not just penalties and fines, but also disgorgement of profits and jail time. 199 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) builds on this foundation by containing a whistleblower bounty provision that allows informants to possibly recover up to 30% of FCPA judgments in excess of $1 million. 200 In the past decade, the number of FCPA enforcement cases has been trending higher. 201 Today, the FCPA is enforced with full weight of the law and on a regular basis with fines as high as $800 million. 202 
B. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
After Watergate, the American public clamored for changes to the way money in politics was regulated. 203 As I have already alluded to, the Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:1
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was only one of the reforms to come out of Watergate. The scandal also inspired campaign finance reformers as well. 204 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA 74) was that signature reform. 205 As the Senate Select Committee explained, "[Our] major legislative recommendations relate to the creation of new institutions necessary to safeguard the electoral process . . . the committee is hopeful that, despite the excesses of Watergate, the Nation will return to its democratic ideals established almost 200 years ago." 206 The concrete legislative suggestions by the Senate Select Committee included:
Draft a code of candidate responsibility, with appropriate disciplinary rules and grievance procedures, to be enforced through a Federal Elections Commission . . . . Require Federal candidates and officeholders to fully disclose all sources of income and assets or liabilities over $1,500 . . . for publication in the Congressional Record . . . . Prohibit candidates for Federal elective office from accepting cash contributions over $50 or spending more than $10,000 in personal funds. 207 The final version of FECA 74 contained many of these basic elements, though the details, like the dollar thresholds, changed during the legislative drafting process. 208 At the urging of advocates, the new law contained public financing, which was not among the original suggestions by the Senate Select Committee. FECA 74 included "hard money" $1,000 contribution 209 and expenditure limits, 210 215 Buckley was a "split the baby" decision worthy of King Solomon. 216 The decision not only diced the statute; it also splintered the Court. 217 The Buckley Supreme Court upheld voluntary public financing, 218 the FEC 219 and FECA's disclosure requirements. 220 The Court decided that contributions could be constitutionally limited, but independent expenditures could not. 221 The Court found under the magic words test that express advocacy could be regulated, but nearly identical sham issue ads could not. 222 Similarly, the Court ruled under the major purpose test that political action committees (PACs) could be regulated, but very similar political organizations could not. 223 Within the Buckley structure are many of the loopholes which allow many of the same practices that FECA 74 was meant to prevent, 224 like soft money to political parties, 225 The problem of money in politics is as real now in 2012 as it was in 1972. On one hand, in 2012 a single individual cannot currently write a $100,000 check to a presidential campaign. 231 Thanks to post-Watergate reforms, individuals have a hard money limit of $2,500 which democratizes how presidential campaigns are run. 232 The fact that presidential candidates now rely on millions of small donors in order to run a campaign is no accident. On the other hand, as explained above, Buckley resulted in "the system we have today: unlimited spending, with candidates forced to raise the sums in relatively small discrete amounts, and to compete in a campaign arms race, all the while worried that a bored millionaire will decide to 'selffinance' . . . ." 234 The litigation that followed Buckley only made matters worse. Key campaign finance protections have eroded in the past forty years because of the Supreme Court. 235 Congress raised federal contribution limits from $1,000 to $2,000 in 2002 and indexed them for inflation so that they grow larger and larger over time. 236 Because of lax regulation at the FEC, post-Watergate disclosures can be evaded by the use of intermediaries.
237
And the FEC is typically deadlocked on key enforcement decisions and rulemakings. 238 In contrast to the hundred million dollar fines which give the FCPA teeth, FECA's largest fine was a $3.8 million civil penalty. 239 Finally, as a sad testament to the deterioration of a once noble reform, only one presidential candidate made use of the Presidential Public Financing System in the 2012 election. Citizens United allows corporations to spend treasury funds on two types of political advertisements. The first is independent expendituresthese are the ads that use Buckley v. Valeo's magic words such as "vote for or vote against," or "support or oppose." 243 The other type of ads that Citizens United allows is electioneering communications or what some call "sham issue ads." These are ads that purport to discuss an issue and have a candidate in them. The whole point of this type of sham issue ads was to avoid the federal corporate independent expenditures ban. Because of McCain-Feingold, these sham issue ads were regulated from 2002-2010. 244 But post-Citizens United, we are now back to where the law was in 1907 (pre-Taft Hartley). Because the Tillman Act is still in effect, corporations cannot give directly to a federal candidate, 245 but they can spend unlimited funds independently in support of or against candidates. So in other words, they cannot give $2,500 directly to a candidate for President, but they could under Citizens United potentially buy Super Bowl ads supporting (or opposing) a candidate. 246 Congress responded to the problem of Watergate's quid pro quo corruption with both changes to the election law in FECA 74 and through the securities laws in the FCPA in 1977. Now, post-Citizens United, I would argue that both campaign finance responses and securities law responses are required. 247 
A. Corporate Law Reforms
Following the money in politics, as Mark Felt suggested to Woodward and Bernstein, remains a challenge. 248 Forty years later, one issue that has persisted long after Watergate is the need for better disclosure of the sources of campaign financing so that the public can keep an eye on who is
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How Much is an Ambassadorship? 93 seeking to influence politics through money. 249 In today's post-Citizens United world, we have a growing problem of undisclosed corporate and union money because of pre-existing disclosure loopholes. 250 The problem is black box spending, which is not a new one, but is only likely to grow after Citizens United. 251 The black boxes are political nonprofits such as social welfare organizations (501(c)(4)s) and trade associations or business leagues (501(c)(6)s). 252 If corporate spending is funneled through one of these groups, then voters and shareholders alike are left in the dark about where the money is coming from in federal elections. 253 In short, if a political donor wishes to remain anonymous, they just need to go through an opaque intermediary like a trade association or 501(c)(4). 254 One of the ways to solve this problem is establishing stronger post-Citizens United SEC rules. There is a petition pending before the SEC right now 255 requesting a new SEC rule which would require transparency for political spending by publicly traded corporations. 256 As of the time of this writing, the SEC had received over 285,000 public comments in support of a new transparency rule.
B. Campaign Finance Reforms
Thoughtful money-in-politics reforms, like accurate disclosure and public financing, are also needed to compliment securities law reforms because the issue of corruption has not gone away. The risk that those in power will shake down those with financial wealth remains a live issue.
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During the McConnell litigation before the Supreme Court, an ex-CEO declared under oath:
When sitting Members solicit large corporate and union contributions, the leaders of these organizations feel intense pressure to contribute, because experience has taught that the consequences of failing to contribute or failing to contribute enough may be very negative. Business and labor leaders believe based on their experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have not contributed. 267 This insider account should give us great pause about what may be going on behind closed doors. 268 This sounds eerily similar to the way Mr. Spater framed the issue of corporate political spending before the Senate Watergate investigators in the 1970s.
Pending campaign finance legislation in Congress could go a long way in revitalizing the way our elections are run. In the House, Rep. Chris Van Hollen has introduced the DISCLOSE Act, which would provide transparency to the source of money in federal elections. 269 Meanwhile, Senator Durbin has introduced the Fair Elections Now Act in the Senate. 270 Fair Elections would give candidates for Congress an incentive to focus on small dollar donors by matching low contributions with federal dollars. 271 
